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Abstract
An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete
preferences deﬁned by families of concave utility functions is consid-
ered. Suﬃcient conditions for the set of eﬃcient allocations and equi-
libria to coincide with the set of eﬃcient allocations and equilibria
that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided.
Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore
hold under these conditions and eﬃcient allocations and equilibria are
characterized by ﬁrst order conditions.
Keywords: incomplete preferences, eﬃcient allocations and equilibria.
1 Introduction
Since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern [25], a number of authors
have raised objections about the use of the completeness axiom in utility
theory (for early work, see for example Luce and Raiﬀa [15], Aumann[2],
Shapley [24]). These objections have on one hand, lead to the development of
axiomatic theories and multi-utility representations of incomplete preferences
(see for example Aumann [2], Maccheroni et al [16], Ok [19]). Incomplete
preferences have, on the other hand, been used in a wide variety of ﬁelds, risk
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2theory (Rothschild and Stiglitz [21]), ﬁnance (Dybvig [10], Jouini and Kallal
[14]), social choice theory, cooperative game theory, asymmetric information
and equilibrium theory (Mas-Colell [18], Gale and Mas-Colell [13]).
Recently there has been a renewed interest for incomplete preferences
with the work of Bewley [4] and Rigotti and Shannon [22] as a way to model
choices in the presence of ambiguity and to explain non participation in mar-
kets for which there is ambiguity and more particularly in ﬁnancial markets
(see Dana and Riedel [9] and Easley and O’hara [11]).
This paper considers an exchange economy populated by a ﬁnite number
I of agents whose preferences are incompletely known. Their utilities may for
example depend on unknown parameters or more generally belong to given
families Ui,i ∈ I of utility functions. For each Ui, the corresponding strict
preference is deﬁned by the unanimity rule: Xi ∈ E is strictly preferred to
Yi ∈ E (which will be denoted Xi ≻Ui Yi) if ui(Xi) > ui(Yi) for every ui ∈ U.
In contrast with the literature on representing incomplete preferences, the
agents’ multi-utilities Ui, i ∈ I are taken as primitive.
The purpose of the paper is to identify conditions under which the fol-
lowing two properties are satisﬁed:
• eﬃcient allocations for the incomplete preferences coincide with the set
of eﬃcient allocations that result for some choice of utilities in the sets
of each agent,
• equilibria for the incomplete preferences coincide with the set of equi-
libria that result for some choice of utilities in the sets of each agent.
Speciﬁc examples have already been considered in the literature (see for ex-
ample Carlier et al [5], Dana [7], Dana and Riedel [9], Rigotti and Shannon
[22]).
A positive answer to the previous questions has numerous implications.
It, in particular, implies that the welfare theorems hold true in an incomplete
preferences framework and that eﬃcient allocations may be characterized by
ﬁrst order conditions (namely the intersection of normalized supergradients
is non empty for some choice of utilities in the sets of each agent).
The paper considers concave multi-utility representations. This covers
the case of families of linear preferences often used in asymetric informa-
tion models, of second order stochastic dominance (Rothschild and Stiglitz






































2incomplete preferences. It is based on a deﬁnition of eﬃciency correspond-
ing to the strict preferences deﬁned above and provides suﬃcient conditions
for obtaining a positive answer to both of the above questions. In particu-
lar compactness conditions on the set of utility functions and on the set of
their super diﬀerentials at any point are required. We also show that the
above questions have a positive answer in the case of second order stochastic
dominance for univariate risks although our technical assumptions are not
satisﬁed in this case.
Given a family of concave utility functions on E, Ui, one can also associate
to it, the preference relation Xi ∈ E is preferred to Yi ∈ E by agent i if
ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Y ) for every ui ∈ Ui. The corresponding strict preference is:
Xi ∈ E is strictly preferred to Yi ∈ E by agent i if ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Y ) for every
ui ∈ Ui with a strict inequality for some ui. Other concepts of eﬃciency may
be considered for that preference relation. When utilities in Ui are strictly
concave, under the hypotheses of the paper, it is shown that all eﬃciency
concepts coincide. The same holds true for equilibrium concepts
The next example shows that one must consider convex families of utilities
Ui whatever strict order or deﬁnition of eﬃciency and equilibria is chosen.
Indeed, consider the case of two agents sharing risk X, the ﬁrst agent has the
CARA utility X1  → −E(e−X1) and the second one has incomplete preferences
given by the family U2 of CARA utilities X2  → −E(e−θX2) where θ ∈ [1/2,2].
Note that U2 is not a convex family. Eﬃcient risk sharing pairs between the





1+θ), θ ∈ [1/2,2]. Consider the following eﬃcient sharing



















The solution of (1.1) is undominated in the incomplete setting (see deﬁnition
3.4 below): there does not exist (X′
1,X′
2) such that −E(e−X′
1) > −E(e−X1)
and −E(e−θX′
2) > −E(e−θX2) for any θ ∈ [1/2,2]. However X1 which is





2(X−X1) = 0 is
not an aﬃne function of X. Therefore it cannot be obtained as an eﬃcient
allocation that result when each agent has a utility in her family. This proves
that some convexity of the sets Ui should be imposed if one wants to answer
positively the ﬁrst question raised above.
The method used is to ﬁrst establish a no trade principle for families
of linear utilities parametrized by a family of convex compact subsets of






































2the no-trade principle, any feasible allocation is eﬃcient if and only if the
compact sets have non-empty intersection. When the compact sets have
empty intersection, there are no eﬃcient allocations. A characterization of
eﬃcient allocations for families of concave utilities is, then obtained by local
linearization of utilities. Thus the paper connects results that have been
proven in the no trade literature (Samet [23], Man-Chung Ng [17]) mainly
for linear utilities and inﬁnite dimensional generalizations of results proven in
the general equilibrium literature for concave utilities (Rigotti and Shannon’s
[22] ambiguity model with incomplete preferences).
The paper is organized as follows. The framework and general assump-
tions and examples are presented in section 2. Section 3 provides an abstract
no-trade principle which nests most of the ex-ante no-trade theorems exist-
ing in the literature. Eﬃciency is then characterized and eﬃcient allocations
for the incomplete preferences are shown to coincide with the set of eﬃcient
allocations that result when each agent has a utility in her family of concave
utility functions. A characterization by ﬁrst order condition is provided. Sec-
tion 4 is devoted to equilibria and welfare theorems. Section 5 discusses some
concepts used in the paper and links the paper to the literature. Section 6
considers the case of second order stochastic dominance where our main as-
sumptions are not satisﬁed and which nonetheless has the property studied
in the paper.
2 Framework, assumptions and examples
2.1 Incomplete preferences framework
Let E and F be two real vector spaces, and (P,X) ∈ F ×E  → P  X ∈ R be
some separating duality mapping which means that this map is bilinear and
• if X ∈ E is such that P   X = 0 for all P ∈ F then X = 0,
• if P ∈ F is such that P   X = 0 for all X ∈ E then P = 0.
We endow F (respectively E) with the locally convex Hausdorﬀ topology
σ(F,E) (resp. σ(E,F)) which is the coarsest topology on F (resp. on E) for
which P ∈ F  → P  X is continuous for every X ∈ E (resp. X ∈ E  → P  X is
continuous for every P ∈ F). With this choice of topologies, the topological
dual of F may be identiﬁed to E and vice versa (see for instance Aliprantis
and Border [1], Theorem 5.83). We shall therefore in the sequel interpret E
as the space of goods and F as the space of prices.
Two polar special cases will mainly be considered. In the ﬁrst, E is a






































2(examples are (E,F) = (L1,L∞) or E is a space of continuous functions and
F a space of Radon measures). In the polar case, F is a Banach space, E = F ′
and σ(F,E) is the weak topology on F (a typical example being E = L∞ and
F = L1). An example covered by our framework but not by the previous two
cases is E = B(Ω,F) the space of real-valued bounded measurable functions
on (Ω,F), a measurable space, E′ =ba(Ω,F) the space of ﬁnitely additive
measures on (Ω,F) and F =ca(Ω,F) the subspace of countably additive
measures on (Ω,F).
An exchange economy with consumption space E populated by a ﬁnite
set I of agents is considered. Agent i ∈ I has an incomplete strict preference
over E, deﬁned by a family Ui : E → R of utility functions as follows: Xi ∈ E
is strictly preferred to Yi ∈ E by agent i, which will be denoted Xi ≻Ui Yi, if
ui(Xi) > ui(Yi) for every ui ∈ Ui.
For X ∈ E (aggregate endowment), the set of allocations of X are deﬁned
as:





An allocation (Xi)i∈I ∈ A(X) is eﬃcient if there is no other allocation
(Yi)i∈I ∈ A(X) fulﬁlling Yi ≻Ui Xi for every i ∈ I. 1
For further use, we recall that for u : E → R concave, the superdiﬀerential
of u at X ∈ E, denoted ∂u(X), is deﬁned by
∂u(X) := {P ∈ E
′ = F : u(Y ) − u(X) ≤ P   (Y − X), for all Y ∈ E}







λ∂ui(X) + (1 − λ)∂vi(X) ⊂ ∂(λui + (1 − λ)vi)(X), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, X ∈ E
∂Ui(X) is convex whenever Ui is convex.
In the sequel, unless otherwise stated, the following assumptions are as-
sumed to hold:
• (H1) For every i ∈ I, utilities in Ui are everywhere ﬁnite, concave
superdiﬀerentiable functions deﬁned on E. Furthermore, for every i,
every ui ∈ Ui and every X ∈ E, ∂ui(X) is σ(F,E) compact.






































2• (H2) For every i ∈ I, the set of utilities Ui is convex and there is a
topology on Ui which makes it compact and such that the evaluation
map ui ∈ Ui  → ui(X) is continuous for every X ∈ E.
• (H3) There exists Φ ∈ E such that, for every i ∈ I, every Xi ∈ E,




Φ   P
: P ∈ ∂Ui(Xi)
o
is σ(F,E) compact for every i and every Xi ∈ E.
Classes of examples where the previous assumptions are satisﬁed are pro-
vided in the next subsection. Let us make some general comments. Regard-
ing assumption (H1), it always holds true if E is a normed space, F = E′
and the elements of Ui are Gˆ ateaux-diﬀerentiable. More generally, (H1) is
satisﬁed if E is a Banach space with dual F and the functions in Ui are con-
cave, u.s.c (for the strong topology) and ﬁnite everywhere. Indeed, they are
then everywhere continuous and superdiﬀerentiable (see Chapter 1 in [12]).
Moreover, their superdiﬀerential being weakly star closed and bounded in
E′ is σ(F,E) compact from Banach-Alaoglu’s Theorem. In (H2), the re-
quirement that Ui is convex has already been discussed in the introduction.
Loosely put, the second part of (H2) says that the set of utilities admits
a compact parametrization. To illustrate (H3), let (Ω,F,P) be given and
assume that there is one good in each state of the world. Let E = L∞ be





, P ∈ ∂Ui(Xi)
￿
is the familiar set of normalized supergradients (or marginal utilities) of the
ui’s at Xi.
2.2 Examples
In this subsection, we show that the assumptions above are satisﬁed in several
quite large classes of examples. For the sake of notational simplicity, we will
drop the subscript i everywhere in these examples.






































2Let E = F = Rd and U be a convex set of concave functions: Rd → R. We
claim that (H1) is trivially satisﬁed. Indeed the elements of U are everywhere
continuous and thus superdiﬀerentiable everywhere with a superdiﬀerential
which is closed and bounded, hence compact at every point.
Let us further assume that for every R > 0
MR := sup{|u(x)|, |x| ≤ R, u ∈ U} < +∞
and that U is closed for the topology of C(Rd) (that is that of uniform
convergence on compact subsets). This implies that (H2) is fulﬁlled and
that ∂U(x) is compact. Indeed for every R > 0, every u ∈ U, every (x,h) ∈
Rd × Rd such that |x| ≤ R, |h| ≤ R and every p ∈ ∂u(x), we have
p   h ≤ u(x) − u(x − h) ≤ 2M2R
hence |p| ≤ KR = 2M2R/R which proves that ∂U(x) is included in the ball
of radius KR and also that u is KR Lipschitz on the ball of radius R. From
Ascoli’s theorem, as U is closed, U is compact in C(Rd) and (H2) is fulﬁlled.
Let us next show that ∂U(x) is closed. Let pn ∈ ∂un(x) converges to some
p. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that un converges
uniformly on every compact to some u ∈ U. Since for every y, we have
un(y) − un(x) ≤ pn(x − y), letting n tend to +∞ gives that p ∈ ∂u(x) ⊂
∂U(x).
Finally, let us assume that there is a common increasing direction, i.e.
some e ∈ Rd such that e p > 0 for every (x,u) ∈ Rd×U and every p ∈ ∂u(x)
and let V (x) be deﬁned as above by
V (x) := {p/(e   p), p ∈ ∂U(x)}
As V (x) is the image of the compact set ∂U(x) by p  → p/(e   p) which is
continuous on ∂U(x), it is compact and (H3) holds true.
This example shows that the assumptions made in the paper are rather
harmless in ﬁnite dimensions.
Linear utilities and expectations with respect to a family of priors
Let Φ ∈ E and K be a convex σ(F,E) compact subset of F such that
K ⊂ {P ∈ F : P   Φ = 1}. Consider the family of linear utilities:
ua(X) = a   X, a ∈ K, X ∈ E and U := {ua, a ∈ K}
Identifying U to K (endowed with σ(F,E)), as ∂U(X) = K ⊂ {P ∈ F :







































2Let us now consider an example. Let A be a compact subset of R, E =
C(A,R) and F = E′ = M(A). One may interpret A as the set of states
of the world and E as the set of contingent claims. Let K be a convex and




X(x)dµ(x), X ∈ E, µ ∈ K
be the expectation of X with respect to the family K of probabilities and let
U := {uµ, µ ∈ K}
(H1) is trivially fulﬁlled. Identifying U to K endowed with the weak-star
topology, (H2) is fulﬁlled. Finally, choosing Φ = 1, as ∂uµ(X) = {µ},
V (X) = K for all X and (H3) is in turn fulﬁlled.
A nonlinear variant of this model satisfying our assumptions as well, is




V (X(x))dµ(x), X ∈ E, µ ∈ K
where V is a given concave diﬀerentiable utility index and µ ranges over
a convex and weakly-star closed set of probability measures K. As vµ is
diﬀerentiable (∂vµ(X) = {V ′(X)µ}), (H1) is trivially fulﬁlled. Identifying U
to K endowed with the weak-star topology, (H2) is fulﬁlled. Let Φ = 1, then
V (X) = {
V ′(X)µ
Eµ(V ′(X)), µ ∈ K} is σ(F,E) compact and (H3) is fulﬁlled. This
incomplete preference may be viewed as an inﬁnite dimensional extension of
Bewley’s [4] and Rigotti and Shannon’s [22] ambiguity incomplete preference.
Other families of linear or non linear utilities may be interpreted as ex-
pectations with respect to a family of priors. For example, one may consider
E = B(Ω,F) and F =ba(Ω,F) and K a weak-star compact subset of proba-
bility measures. Fixing a probability P, one may also consider pairs such as
(E,F) = (Lp,Lp′) (with p ∈ (1,∞)), (E,F) = (L1,L∞), (E,F) = (L∞,L1)
and K a σ(F,E) compact subset of probability densities. Nonlinear variants
of these models also provide inﬁnite dimensional extensions of Bewley’s [4]
and Rigotti and Shannon [22]’s ambiguity models (see Dana and Riedel [9]
for a dynamic example).
Incomplete preferences on random vectors
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space. We now consider strict orders on random






































2(1,∞) with conjugate exponent p′ = p/(p − 1) and E = Lp((Ω,F,P),Rd)
and E′ = F = Lp′((Ω,F,P),Rd) with the usual duality map between these
spaces. As the class of concave functions does not satisfy our assumptions,
let us consider a class V of concave and C1 functions Rd → R such that:
1. V is convex and closed for the topology of C(Rd) (i.e. uniform conver-
gence on compact sets),
2. The utilities and their gradients fulﬁll a uniform growth conditions:
there is a constant C such that
|v(x)| ≤ C(|x|
p + 1), |∇v(x)| ≤ C(|x|
p−1 + 1), ∀(x,v) ∈ R
d × V,
3. The utilities and their gradients are equicontinuous on compact sets:





|v(x) − v(y)| + |∇v(x) − ∇v(y)|
o
= 0.
4. there exists a unit vector e ∈ Rd such that
e   ∇v(x) > 0, ∀(v,x) ∈ V × R
d
Note that from Ascoli’s theorem, assumptions 1 and 3 guarantee that V is
compact for the topology of C1(Rd).
Let U be the set of expected utilities generated by V i.e.
U := {uv := E(v(.)), v ∈ V}
Assumption 2 insures that uv and ∇uv are well deﬁned. Let U be endowed
with the topology induced by the topology of C(Rd) on V. From assumption
2 and Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, the evaluation maps v  →
E(v(X)) are continuous and the elements of U are continuous for the strong
topology of E. Hence (H1) and (H2) are fulﬁlled. Let us check that (H3)
is satisﬁed when one takes P   Φ := E(e   P). For X ∈ E, let
V (X) :=
n ∇v(X)
E(e   ∇v(X))
, v ∈ V
o
Note that V (X) is convex. We claim that V (X) is strongly compact in F.
Indeed, let
Yn = λn∇vn(X), λn :=
1






































2be some sequence in V (X). From assumption 3 and Ascoli’s theorem, a
subsequence (vn,∇vn) converges in C(Rd) to some (v,∇v) with v ∈ V. Us-
ing again assumption 3 and Lebesgue’s dominated theorem, we deduce that
∇vn(X) − ∇v(X) converges to 0 strongly in F. This implies that λn also
converges and that Yn converges strongly in F to
∇v(X)
E(e   ∇v(X))
.
Since V (X) is convex, we thus have (H3).






may as well be considered (H1), (H2) and (H3) are fulﬁlled under similar
assumptions as above, uniform in ω.
In the previous examples, except in the ﬁnite dimensional case, utilities
were assumed diﬀerentiable. Let us now consider an example of families of
superdiﬀerentiable utilities.
Families of Rank-linear Utilities
Let (Ω,F,P) be a non-atomic probability space, E = L∞((Ω,F,P),R) and
F = L1((Ω,F,P),R). Rank-linear-utilities both generalize expected utilities
and Choquet’s integrals with respect to a distortion and are of the form








X = inf{z ∈ R : FX(z) > t} denotes the quantile of X and l is a
smooth function, concave nondecreasing in its second argument and submod-
ular (i.e. ∂2
txl ≥ 0). The expected utility is obtained for l(t,x) = v(x) and
v : R → R concave nondecreasing, the Choquet expectation with respect to
a convex C1 distortion f for l(t,x) = f′(1−t)x and the risk averse RDU for
l(t,x) = f′(1 − t)v(x) with f convex and v concave nondecreasing.
Let us consider the family of utilities
U := {ul, l ∈ L}
where L is a convex and compact (for the C([0,1] × R) topology) set of







































txl > 0. We identify U with L. From a supermodular version of Hardy-
Littlewood’s theorem, one has for every l ∈ L
ul(X) = min{E(l(U,X)), U uniform}
The superdiﬀerentiability properties of such utilities have been studied in [6]
where it is proved that
∂ul(X) = co{∂xl(U,X), U ∈ VX}
where co denotes closed convex hull operation for the L1(Ω,F,P) topology
and VX denotes the set of uniformly distributed random variables such that
ul(X) = E(l(U,X)). Note that since ∂ul(X) is a bounded subset of L∞, it is
σ(L1,L∞)- compact. The class U therefore satisﬁes (H1) and (H2). If we




then taking again Φ = 1, we claim that (H3) is also satisﬁed. Indeed, let









This set is bounded in L∞ and thus σ(L1,L∞) relatively compact in L1. To
show that V (X) is σ(L1,L∞) closed, since it is convex, it suﬃces to prove
that it is strongly closed. Let us then suppose that Yn = Zn/E(Zn) with
Zn ∈ ∂uln(X) for some ln ∈ L converges in L1 to some Y . Since E(Zn) is
bounded and bounded away from 0, up to a subsequence, we may assume
that Zn converges in L1 to some Z and that ln converges to l. Passing to the
limit in the inequality
uln(Y ) − uln(X) ≤ Zn   (Y − X), for allY ∈ E
and using the continuity of the evaluation maps, we obtain that Z ∈ ∂ul(X).
Hence Y = Z/E(Z) ∈ V (X) which proves (H3).
3 No-trade principle and eﬃcient allocations
3.1 No-trade principle for sets of linear utilities
We ﬁrst consider families of linear utilities on E. Agent i’s set of utilities is






































2assumed that the family (Ki)i∈I lies in a common hyperplane of F: there
exists Φ ∈ E such that ai   Φ = 1 for all ai ∈ Ki and all i. We show that no
subset of agents can make a proﬁtable trade if and only if
T
i∈I Ki  = ∅. The
main part of the proof of the theorem that follows (that is the equivalence
between 1 and 2), is an inﬁnite dimensional version of Samet’s theorem [23].
Theorem 3.1. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. There exists no (Xi)i∈I ∈ EI with
P
i∈I Xi = 0 such that ai   Xi > 0
for all ai ∈ Ki and all i ∈ I,
2.
T
i∈I Ki  = ∅,
3. There exists P ∈ F such that for all i ∈ I, ai   Xi > 0 for all ai ∈ Ki
implies P   Xi > 0.
Proof. • 1. implies 2. Assume 1. and that
T
i∈I Ki = ∅. Let K =
K1 × K2 ... × KI and L = {(P,P,...,P), P ∈ F} be the diagonal of
F I. We then have K ∩L = ∅. Since K is σ(F,E) compact and convex
and L is σ(F,E)-closed convex, from Hahn-Banach’s theorem, there
exists (Xi)i∈I ∈ EI and c ∈ R such that
X
i
ai   Xi > c ≥ P   (
X
i
Xi), for all P ∈ F, ai ∈ Ki, i ∈ I
From the right-hand side, we obtain that
P
i∈I Xi = 0 and c ≥ 0.
Let ai ∈ argminai∈Kiai   Xi and ci = ai   Xi. We claim that there
exists ci < ci for all i ∈ I with
P
i ci = 0. If not
P
i ci would have a
constant sign (strictly negative) on {(ci) ∈ RI | ci − ci > 0, ∀ i ∈ I}
contradicting
P
i∈I ci > 0. Let ˜ Xi = Xi−ciΦ. We have
P
i ˜ Xi = 0 and
ai   ˜ Xi = ai   Xi − ciai   Φ = ai   Xi − ci > 0 for every ai ∈ Ki, i ∈ J
contradicting 1. Therefore
T
i=I Ki  = ∅.
• 2 implies 3. Indeed, any P ∈
T
i∈I Ki fulﬁlls 3.
• 3. implies 1. If
P
i∈I Xi = 0 and ai   Xi > 0 for all ai ∈ Ki and all
i ∈ I, then P   Xi > 0 for all i ∈ I contradicting
P
i∈I Xi = 0.
Remark 3.2. It follows from assertion 3 that the assertions of theorem 3.1
are also equivalent to: there exists no J ⊂ I and no (Xi)i∈J ∈ EJ with P






































2The hypothesis that there exists Φ ∈ E such that ai   Φ = 1 for all
ai ∈ Ki and all i is in particular veriﬁed for Φ = 1 when (Ki)i∈I are subsets
of probabilities or densities interpreted as sets of possible priors of the agents.
The equivalence between assertions 1 and 2 of theorem 3.1 provides an ex-
ante no-trade principle. By applying theorem 3.1 to various pairs (E,F), one
recovers most of the no-trade results that have been proved in the literature.
Samet [23] considers the case of E = Rm, F = E′ and of a collection of
non-empty convex closed subsets of e probabilities (Ki)i∈I. Man-Chung Ng
[17] considers E = C(A) the set of continuous functions on a compact set A
endowed with the sup-norm and F = E′ the set of ﬁnite Borel measures on A
and a collection (Ki)i∈I ⊂ F of non-empty convex weak star compact subsets
of probability measures. For a given probability space (Ω,F,P), Dana and
Riedel [9] consider E = L∞(Ω,R), F = L1(Ω,R) and (Ki)i∈I a collection
of non-empty convex σ(L∞,L1) compact subsets of densities. Finally Billot
et al [3] consider E = B(Ω,F) the space of real-valued bounded measurable
functions on Ω, F = E′ =ba(Ω,F) the space of ﬁnitely additive measures
on (Ω,F) and (Ki)i∈I a collection of non-empty weak star (σ(F,E)) closed,
convex subsets of countably additive probability measures on (Ω,F).
3.2 No-trade principle for sets of concave utilities
We next consider the case where agents’ preferences are given by families of
concave utilities. The next lemma characterizes the directions in which pref-
erences are increasing in a neighborhood of Xi and shows that locally these
directions coincide with the directions in which the linear utilities associated
to the family of compact sets (Vi(Xi))i∈I are increasing.
Lemma 3.3. Let Xi ∈ E and Yi ∈ E be given. The following are equivalent:
1. There exists t0 > 0 such that for all t ∈ (0,t0], Xi + tYi ≻Ui Xi,
2. there exists t0 > 0 such that Xi + t0Yi ≻Ui Xi,
3. for any P ∈ Vi(Xi), P   Yi > 0 (or equivalently P   Yi > 0 for all
P ∈ ∂ui(Xi) and ui ∈ Ui).
Proof. Let us ﬁrst remark that since ui is concave, the map t → t−1(ui(Xi +
tYi) − ui(Xi)) is nonincreasing on (0,∞). Hence ui(Xi + t0Yi) − ui(Xi) > 0
implies that ui(Xi + tYi) − ui(Xi) > 0 for all t ≤ t0. Therefore, assertions 1
and 2 are equivalent. Let us prove that 2 and 3 are equivalent. Let Yi fulﬁll 3






































2for all P ∈ ∂ui(Xi), there exists m > 0 such that min{P∈∂ui(Xi)} P   Yi ≥ m.
Since ui is concave, for every (Xi,Yi) ∈ E2,




P   Yi as t → 0
+,
hence for every ui ∈ Ui, there exists tui > 0 such that if t ≤ tui, ui(X+tY )−
ui(X) > 0. Let t > 0 be given and let
Wi(t) = {ui ∈ Ui | ui(Xi + tYi) − ui(Xi) > 0}
From what preceeds, Ui = ∪t>0Wi(t). From (H2), the evaluation maps being
continuous, Vi(t) is open. From (H2), Ui is compact, hence there exists a
ﬁnite subcovering of Ui, Vi(t1),...,Vi(tk). Let t0 = minj tj. We then have
that Xi + t0Yi ≻Ui Xi.
Conversely, let Yi fulﬁll 2. Then that there exists t0 > 0 such that Xi +
t0Yi ≻Ui Xi. For any ui ∈ Ui, we have
0 > ui(Xi) − ui(Xi + t0Yi) ≥ −t0P   Yi, for any Yi ∈ ∂ui(Xi)
Hence P  Yi > 0 for any ui ∈ Ui and P ∈ ∂ui(Xi), equivalently P  Yi > 0 for
any P ∈ Vi(Xi) proving that 2 implies 3.
A non linear no-trade principle now follows:
Theorem 3.4. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. There exists no (Yi)i∈I ∈ EI with
P
i∈I Yi = 0 such that Xi +Yi ≻Ui Xi
for all i ∈ I,
2.
T
i∈I Vi(Xi)  = ∅,
3. there exists P ∈ F such that for all i ∈ I, Xi + tiYi ≻Ui Xi for some
ti > 0 implies P   Yi > 0.
Proof. Let us show that 1 implies 2. From lemma 3.3, if assertion 1 holds
true, there exists no (Yi)i∈I ∈ EI with
P
i∈I Yi = 0 such that P   Yi > 0
for all P ∈ Vi(Xi) and all i ∈ I. From theorem 3.1 and (H3), we have T
i∈I Vi(Xi)  = ∅.
2 implies 3. Assume 2, then from theorem 3.1, there exists P ∈ F such that
for all i, Q   Yi > 0 for all Q ∈ Vi(Xi) implies P   Yi > 0. From lemma 3.3,
there exists P ∈ F such that for all i Xi+tiYi ≻Ui Xi for some ti > 0 implies
P   Yi > 0. Finally, the fact that 3 implies 1 is obvious.
Remark 3.5. It follows from remark 3.2 that the assertions above are also
equivalent to: ”there exists no J ⊂ I and (Yi)i∈J ∈ EI with
P
i∈J Yi = 0






































23.3 Eﬃcient allocations and no-trade
Setting U := Πi∈IUi, we may now deﬁne U-eﬃcient allocations.
Deﬁnition 3.6. Let (Xi)i∈I ∈ A(X), then (Xi)i∈I is U-eﬃcient if there is
no (Yi)i∈I ∈ A(X) such that Yi ≻Ui Xi for every i ∈ I .
Let us ﬁrst remark that if for each i, there exists ui ∈ Ui such that (Xi)i∈I
is eﬃcient for the economy with complete preferences represented by the
(ui)i∈I, then (Xi)i∈I is U- eﬃcient. If not there would exist (Yi)i∈I ∈ A(X)
such that, for all i Yi ≻Ui Xi and in particular ui(Yi) > ui(Xi) contradicting
the eﬃciency of (Xi)i∈I for the (ui)i∈I.
We next characterize U-eﬃciency and state our ﬁrst main result that provides
a positive answer to the ﬁrst question adressed by the paper.
Theorem 3.7. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. The allocation (Xi)i∈I ∈ A(X) is U-eﬃcient,
2. there exists no trade (Yi)i∈I ∈ EI with
P
i∈I Yi = 0 such that Xi+Yi ≻Ui
Xi for all i ∈ I,
3.
T
i∈I Vi(Xi)  = ∅ ,
4. there exists (ui)i∈I, ui ∈ Ui for each i such that (Xi)i∈I is eﬃcient for
the economy with complete preferences represented by the (ui)i∈I.
Proof. 1. implies 2 follows directly from the deﬁnition of eﬃciency. 2. implies
3. follows from theorem 3.4. 3. implies 4. since
T
i∈I Vi(Xi)  = ∅ implies that
for each i, there exists ui ∈ Ui and λi > 0 such that
T
i∈I λi∂ui(Xi)  = ∅ which
implies 4. 4 implies 1 was already discussed.
Corollary 3.8. Let utilities be linear and fulﬁll the hypotheses of subsection
3.1. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
1. Any allocation (Xi)i∈I ∈ A(X) is U-eﬃcient,
2. there exists no (Xi)i∈I ∈ EI with
P
i∈I Xi = 0 such that ai   Xi > 0 for
all ai ∈ Ki and all i ∈ I,
3.
T






































2Let agents have endowments Wi ∈ E, i ∈ I with X =
P
i Wi. When
is no-trade eﬃcient, in other words when is (W1,...,WI) eﬃcient? The
following corollary follows directly from theorem 3.7.
Corollary 3.9. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. No-trade is U-eﬃcient,
2.
T
i∈I Vi(Wi)  = ∅
3. there exists (ui)i∈I such that no-trade is eﬃcient for the economy with
complete preferences represented by the (ui)i∈I .
Remark 3.10. A further assumption that can be made is that E is ordered
by a closed convex cone E+ in E with non nonempty interior, polar to a
convex cone F+ in F (the cone of nonnegative prices). Adding nonnegativity
constraints in the model, agents choose consumptions in E+ and their utility
functions deﬁned on E+, are assumed to be concave, super diﬀerentiable on
the interior of E+ and monotone with respect to the order associated to E+.
Let A+(X) := {(Xi)i ∈ I ∈ A(X) Xi ∈ E+, ∀i ∈ I}. Assuming (H2)
and ∂ui(X) ∈ F and σ(F,E) compact and Vi(X)σ(F,E) compact at any
interior point X of E+ and any i, theorem 3.7 can be stated as: an interior
allocation (Xi)i∈I is U-eﬃcient if and only if there exists (ui)i∈I, ui ∈ Ui for
each i such that(Xi)i∈I is eﬃcient for the economy with complete preferences
represented by the (ui)i∈I.
4 Equilibria
4.1 Equilibria and welfare theorems
A price P ∈ F supports the preferred set to Xi if Yi ≻Ui Xi implies P   Yi >
P   Xi. Supporting prices to a preferred set have appeared in the previous
section in theorem 3.1 and lemma 3.3. The next lemma characterizes them.
Lemma 4.1. For P ∈ F, the following are equivalent
1. Yi ≻Ui Xi implies P   Yi > P   Xi,
2. λP ∈ Vi(Xi) for some λ > 0,






































2Proof. To show that 1 implies 2, let P ∈ F be such that Yi ≻Ui Xi implies P  
Yi > P  Xi. Assume that λP  ∈ Vi(Xi) for all λ > 0. Since from (H3), Vi(Xi)
is σ(F,E) compact, from Hahn-Banach’s theorem there exists Zi ∈ E such
that
λP   Zi ≤ 0 < min
H∈Vi(Xi)
H   Zi
Since H   Zi > 0, for all H ∈ Vi(Xi), from lemma 3.3, for t > 0 suﬃciently
small Xi + tZi ≻Ui Xi while P   Zi < 0 contradicting assertion 1.
2 implies 3, since if λP ∈ Vi(Xi) for some λ > 0, there exists ui ∈ Ui such
that λP ∈ ∂ui(Xi). Hence Xi maximizes ui(Y ) subject to P   Y ≤ P   Xi.
Finally to show that 3 implies 1, if 3 holds true, then there exists ui ∈ Ui
and λ > 0 such that λP ∈ ∂ui(Xi). Let Y ≻Ui Xi, we then have
0 > ui(Xi) − ui(Y ) ≥ P   (Xi − Y )
and therefore P   Y > P   Xi proving 1.
The second main result of the paper, the characterization of equilibria for
the incomplete preferences follows directly from the previous lemma as well
as the characterisation of the demand correspondence.
The demand correspondence for the incomplete preference ≻Ui at price
P and wealth P   Wi is deﬁned by:
ξi(P,P Wi) = {Xi ∈ E : P Xi = P Wi and X
′ ≻Ui X implies P X
′ > P Wi}
Thanks to lemma 4.1, the demand correspondence is characterized as follows.
Corollary 4.2. For P ∈ F, the following are equivalent
1. Xi ∈ ξi(P,P   Wi),
2. λP ∈ Vi(Xi) for some λ > 0,
3. there exists ui ∈ Ui such that Xi maximizes ui(Y ) s.t. P   Y ≤ P   Wi.
We now turn to the deﬁnition of concepts of equilibria and their charac-
terization.
Deﬁnition 4.3. An allocation X ∗ = (X∗
i )i∈I ∈ A(X) with a price P ∗ ∈ F,
is a U-equilibrium with transfer payments if for every i, Xi ≻Ui X∗
i implies
P ∗   Xi > P ∗   X∗
i . An allocation (X∗
i )i∈I ∈ A(X) with a price P ∗ ∈ F, is a
U-equilibrium if for every i, P ∗   X∗
i = P ∗   Wi and for every i, Xi ≻Ui X∗
i






































2Theorem 4.4. The following are equivalent
1. (X ∗,P ∗) is a U-equilibrium with transfer payments,
2. λP ∗ ∈
Td
i∈I Vi(X∗
i ) for some λ > 0,
3. there exists (ui) ∈ U such that (X ∗,P ∗) is an equilibrium with transfer
payment of the economy with utilities (ui).
The following are equivalent:
1. (X ∗,P ∗) is a U-equilibrium,
2. λP ∗ ∈
Td
i∈I Vi(X∗
i ) for some λ > 0 and for every i, P ∗   X∗
i = P ∗   Wi,
3. there exists (ui) ∈ U such that (X ∗,P ∗) is an equilibrium of the economy
with utilities (ui).
The proof of Proposition 4.4 follows directly from lemma 4.1.
Remark 4.5. As in remark 3.10, the case of consumptions in E+ may be
considered. Under the same assumptions as those of remark 3.10), one can
state the second part of theorem 4.4 as interior U-equilibria coincide with
interior equilibria of the economies with utilities (ui) for some (ui) ∈ U.
We may now prove the welfare theorems for incomplete preferences.
Theorem 4.6. The following assertions hold:
1. Any U-equilibrium is U-eﬃcient.
2. Any U-eﬃcient allocation is a U-equilibrium with transfer payments for
some P ∈ F.
Proof. Proof of assertion 1. From theorem 4.4, any U-equilibrium (X ∗,P ∗)
is an equilibrium for the some economy with complete preferences ui, i ∈ I,
hence is eﬃcient in that economy. From theorem 3.7, (X∗
i )i∈I is U-eﬃcient.
Let us now prove assertion 2: if (X∗
i )i∈I is U-eﬃcient, from theorem 3.7,
it is eﬃcient for the some economy with complete preferences ui, i ∈ I,
hence there exists P ∗, such that ((X∗
i )i∈I,P ∗) is an equilibrium with transfer
payments ui, i ∈ I. From 4.4, ((X∗







































24.2 Equilibria with inertia
Bewley [4] introduced the principle of inertia: agents never trade to a po-
sition which is not unanimously preferred to their status quo. As noted by
Rigotti and Shannon [22], the restriction of inertia plays the role of a natural
equilibrium reﬁnement. The deﬁnition of equilibrium is modiﬁed as follows.
An equilibrium of the economy (X ∗,P ∗) satisﬁes the inertia condition if for
all agents i with X∗
i  = Wi, we have X∗
i ≻Ui Wi. Following Dana and Riedel
[9], suﬃcient conditions for existence of equilibrium with inertia are provided.




Let us introduce a new assumption:
(H4) The economy with utilities (ψi), i ∈ I has an equilibrium which
furthermore fulﬁlls ψi(X∗
i ) > ψi(Wi) if X∗
i  = Wi.
Proposition 4.7. Assume (H2) and (H4). Then any equilibrium of the
economy with complete preferences (ψi)i∈I is an equilibrium with inertia.
Proof. Let (X∗,P ∗) be an equilibrium of the economy with complete pref-
erences (ψi)i∈I. If Xi ≻Ui X∗
i , then ui(Xi) > ui(X∗
i ) for any ui ∈ Ui, hence
from (H2), ψi(Xi) > ψi(X∗
i ) and P ∗   Xi > P ∗   X∗
i . Therefore (X∗,P ∗) is
a U-equilibrium. By assumption if X∗
i  = Wi, ψi(X∗
i ) > ψi(Wi) = 0, hence
ui(X∗
i ) > ui(Wi) for any ui ∈ Ui, thus X∗
i ≻Ui Wi. Thus (X∗,P ∗) is a
U-equilibrium with inertia.
Lemma 4.8. If the ui are strictly concave, then any equilibrium of the econ-
omy with complete preferences (ψi)i∈I veriﬁes ψi(X∗
i ) > ψi(Wi) if X∗
i  = Wi.
Proof. Since, under (H2), ψi is strictly concave, any equilibrium allocation
X∗ veriﬁes ψi(X∗
i ) > ψi(Wi) = 0 if X∗
i  = Wi. If not, we would have ψi(X∗
i ) =
ψi(Wi) = 0 and X∗
i  = Wi. Hence ψi((X∗
i + Wi)/2) > ψi(X∗
i ), implying
P ∗   Wi > P ∗   X∗
i contradicting the deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
It follows from lemma 4.8 that if utilities are strictly concave, the existence
of an equilibrium with inertia may be brought down to the existence of an






































2Remark 4.9. In the proof of proposition 4.7, we have used the following
properties on (ψi)i∈I:
1. (H4) is fulﬁlled,
2. X ≻Ui Y implies that ψi(X) > ψi(Y ),
3. ψi(X) > ψi(Wi) is equivalent to X ≻Ui Wi.
From assertion 1, one deduces existence of an equilibrium for the economy
with complete preferences (ψi)i∈I, from assertion 2 that the equilibrium is an
equilibrium for the economy with incomplete preferences and from assertion
3 that the equilibrium fulﬁlls the inertia property. Assuming (H4) fulﬁlled,
we could have used other utilities such as ˜ ψi(X) = minUi(
ui(X)
ui(Wi)) or ˜ ψi(X) =
minUi φi(ui(X)−ui(Wi)) with φi : R → R increasing strictly concave fulﬁlling
φi(0) = 0 suggesting the indeterminacy of equilibria with inertia.
5 Discussions of concepts
5.1 Preferences
Given the family of utilities Ui, we have considered the strict incomplete
preference deﬁned by: Yi ≻Ui Xi if and only if ui(Yi) > ui(Xi) for all ui ∈ Ui.
Given Ui, another preference may be considered : Yi  e Ui Xi if and only if
ui(Yi) ≥ ui(Xi) for all ui ∈ Ui. The strict associated preference is Yi ≻e Ui Xi
if and only if ui(Yi) ≥ ui(Xi) for all ui ∈ Ui with a strict inequality for some
ui ∈ Ui. Clearly Yi ≻Ui Xi implies that Yi ≻e Ui Xi.
5.2 Concepts of eﬃciency and equilibria
Two concepts of eﬃciency may be associated to the order Yi  e Ui Xi :
1. (Xi)i∈I is strongly-e U-eﬃcient if there does not exist (Yi)i∈I ∈ A(X)
such that Yi  e Ui Xi for all i, strictly for some i,
2. (Xi)i∈I is weakly-e U eﬃcient if there does not exist (Yi)i∈I ∈ A(X) such
that Yi ≻ ˜ Ui Xi for all i ∈ I.
Let us now discuss the relations between the diﬀerent concepts. By deﬁni-






































2Proposition 5.1. Assume (H1-H3) If the ui are strictly concave, U eﬃ-
ciency , strong-e U-eﬃciency and weak-e U-eﬃciency are equivalent.
Proof. It remains to show that U-eﬃciency implies strong-e U-eﬃciency. Let
(Xi)i∈I be U-eﬃcient and assume that there exists (Yi)i∈I ∈ A(X) such that
ui(Yi) ≥ ui(Xi) for all i with a strict inequality for some i and some ui. Let
(Zi = (Yi + Xi)/2) ∈ A(X), ui(Zi) ≥ ui(Xi) for all i, and for all i such that
Zi  = Xi, ui(Zi) > ui(Xi) for all ui ∈ Ui. From remark 3.5, this contradicts
Ui-eﬃciency.
A counterexample Let us now give a counterexample where the set of
strong-e U-eﬃcient allocations is strictly smaller than the set of U eﬃcient
allocations. Assume that there are k states of the world with probabilities
πi, i = 1,...,k and one good in each state of the world. A contingent claim
X = (x1,...,xk) where xj is the amount to be received in state j is identiﬁed
to an element of Rk. Hence E = F = Rk. Let (Pi)i∈I be a family of compact
convex subsets of the probability simplex and denote by ri Pi the relative
interior of Pi. Let
Ui = {ui : R
k → R s.t. ui(X) = Eπ(X) =
X
πixi, π ∈ Pi, X ∈ R
k}
Let Yi  e Ui Xi if and only if Eπ(Yi) ≥ Eπ(Xi) for all π ∈ Pi and Yi ≻e Ui Xi if
and only if Eπ(Yi) ≥ Eπ(Xi) for all π ∈ Pi with a strict inequality for some
π ∈ Pi. Let X ∈ Rk be the aggregate endowment. When utilities are linear,
either all feasible allocations are eﬃcient or there is no eﬃcient allocation.
From Dana and Le Van [8], any feasible allocation is e U-eﬃcient if and only
if ∩iri Pi  = ∅, while from section 3, any feasible allocation is U-eﬃcient if
and only if ∩iPi  = ∅. It is easy to construct examples where ∩iriPi = ∅ and
∩iPi  = ∅.
An allocation (X∗
i )i∈I ∈ A(X) with a price P ∗ ∈ F, is a ˜ U-equilibrium if
for every i, P ∗   X∗
i = P ∗   Wi and Xi ≻ ˜ Ui X∗
i implies P ∗   Xi > P ∗   Wi.
Note that any ˜ U-equilibrium is a U-equilibrium since Xi ≻Ui X∗
i implies
Xi ≻ ˜ Ui X∗
i .
Proposition 5.2. If the ui are strictly concave, an allocation (X∗
i )i∈I ∈
A(X) with a price P ∗ ∈ F, is a ˜ U-equilibrium if an only if it is a U-equilibrium
Proof. It remains to show that if (X ∗,P ∗) is a U-equilibrium, then it is a ˜ U-
equilibrium. Let (X ∗,P ∗) be a U-equilibrium and assume that there exists for
some i, Xi such that ui(Xi) ≥ ui(X∗






































2ui and P ∗ Xi ≤ P ∗ X∗
i = P ∗ Wi. Let Zi = (Xi+X∗
i )/2. Then P ∗ Zi ≤ P ∗ Wi
and Zi ≻Ui X∗
i . Indeed, since Xi  = X∗
i , ui(Zi) = ui((Xi + X∗
i )/2) > ui(X∗
i )
for all ui, contradicting the assumption that (X ∗,P ∗) is a U-equilibrium of
the economy with utilities (ui).
6 Second order stochastic dominance
The aim of this ﬁnal section is to extend theorems 3.7 and 4.4 to the case of
the concave order in one dimension, a case in which neither (H2) nor (H3)
are fulﬁlled. Let (Ω,F,P) be a non-atomic probability space and consider
the set of bounded real-valued random variables, L∞ = L∞((Ω,F,P),R).
Let U be the set of strictly concave increasing utilities on R. For X and Y
in L∞, let us denote X ≻ Y if and only if E(v(X)) > E(v(Y )), for all v ∈ U.
As is well-know, the corresponding large preference, X   Y , is deﬁned by
X   Y if and only if E(v(X)) ≥ E(v(Y )), for all v concave nondecreasing.





: Y ∈ ∂u(X), u ∈ U
￿
.
be the set of normalized supergradients at X ∈ L∞.
Proposition 6.1. Let (Xi)i∈I ∈ A(X). Then the following statements are
equivalent:
1. (Xi)i∈I is strongly-e U eﬃcient,
2. (Xi)i∈I is U-eﬃcient,
3. (Xi)i∈I is a comonotone allocation of X,
4. there exist continuous and strictly concave increasing functions (u1,...,uI)




i∈I V (Xi)  = ∅.
Proof. The equivalence between assertions 1 and 2 follow from Proposition
5.1, that between 1, 3 and 4 from Carlier Dana and Galichon [5]. The







































2Given individual endowments (Wi)i∈I and deﬁning U-equilibria as previ-
ously, under some technical assumptions on the aggregate risk X =
P
i∈I Wi,
we have the following characterization
Theorem 6.2. Assume that FX, the cumulative distribution function of X
is increasing and continuous, then the following assertions are equivalent:
1. (X ∗,P ∗) is a U-equilibrium,
2. there exists λ > 0 such that λP ∗ ∈
Td
i∈I Vi(X∗
i ) and E(P ∗X∗
i ) =
E(P ∗Wi) for every i ∈ I,
3. there exists (ui)i∈I ∈ UI such that (X ∗,P ∗) is an equilibrium of the
economy with utilities (ui)i∈I.
Proof. Clearly, assertions 2 and 3 are equivalent and assertion 3 implies as-
sertion 1. Let us now assume that (X ∗,P ∗) = ((X∗
i )i,P ∗) is a U-equilibrium,
which means that (X∗




∗Y ) > E(P
∗X
∗
i ) = E(P
∗Wi). (6.1)
First, we claim that the X∗
i ’s are P ∗-measurable, since if not taking Yi :=
E(X∗
i |P ∗) ≻ X∗
i as E(P ∗Yi) = E(P ∗X∗
i ), we would derive a contradiction to
(6.1). Hence X∗
i = fi(P ∗) and X = f(P ∗) with f =
P
i∈I fi. This implies
that P ∗ is non-atomic since otherwise X would have an atom, contradicting
the assumption that FX is continuous. Since P ∗ is non-atomic, we may
ﬁnd nonincreasing functions gi such that Yi := gi(P ∗) has the same law as
X∗
i = fi(P ∗). If X∗
i  = Yi ae, then (X∗
i + Yi)/2 ≻ X∗
i implying from (6.1)
that E(P ∗Yi) > E(P ∗X∗
i ) which contradicts Hardy-Littlewood’s inequality
E(P ∗Yi) ≤ E(P ∗X∗
i ). Hence it must be the case that X∗
i = gi(P ∗) a.s.:
the X∗
i ’s are nonincreasing functions of P ∗. We may therefore ﬁnd concave
functions ui such that P ∗ ∈ ∂ui(X∗
i ) for every i; furthermore, since P ∗ ≥ 0,
ui can also be taken nondecreasing. It remains to prove that the ui’s are
strictly concave on the closed convex hull of the range of X∗
i . To prove this
fact, given Y ∈ L∞, let F
−1
Y be the generalized inverse (or quantile function)
of the cumulative distribution function FY. Since X =
P
i∈I gi(P ∗) =: g(P ∗)
with all the gi’s nonincreasing, for Lebesgue almost-every t ∈ [0,1], we have
F
−1
X (t) = g(F
−1












Since we have assumed that FX is increasing, F
−1
X is continuous. It thus fol-
lows from that previous identity that F
−1
X∗







































2is increasing for every i. If ui was aﬃne one some nondegenerate inter-
val [a,b] ⊂ [essinfX∗
i ,esssupX∗
i ], then P ∗ would be constant on the set
(X∗
i )−1((a,b)). Since FX∗
i is increasing, this set would have positive prob-
ability and P ∗ would have an atom and we already know that this cannot
happen. All the ui’s can therefore be chosen strictly concave (and thus in-
creasing) implying assertion 2.
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